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Abstract
This paper examines the labour supply behaviour of married women in France.
Estimating a model with tax parameter variation, careful re-examination of the
treatment of the unearned income variable and taking account of education in
moJelling preferences result in substantially lower elasticities than found in our
previous empirical analysis. It turns out that distinguishing between part-time,
full-time and lon~hoursgives virtuallythesame results as treatingobservedhours
as reflecting desired hours. We provide extensive specification diagnostics, inc-
luding Heckman-Andrews tests, as well as Hausman tests for the comparison of
different handlings of the hours information. We also consider different
assumptionsconcerningtheperceptionoftheimpactofthetaxsystem andprovide
some evidence in favour ofa correct perception.
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The extent to which observed working hours reflect individual decisions may be
important for the reliability ofeconometric mo~els of labour supply behaviour.
Indeed,therehasbeenanincreasingawarenessoftheneedtoallowforconstraints
in empirical labour supply models see, among others, Ham (1982, 1986) and
Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1989). Where there are also a significant number of
individualswho areobserved not toparticipate in the labourmarket, as is thecase
for the sample of married women used in this study, a careful treatment of the
relationship between desired hours of work and non-participation would seem
critical. In particular it is natural to draw a distinction between those individuals
who are out of work but actively seeking employment from those who are not
involved in active job search (see for example Flinn and Heckman, 1983).
Thehoursofworkofmarriedwomen in Franceseempotentiallysensitivetothese
issues as there appearssignificant bunching of-hours atparticularpointswhich do
not appear to necessarily reflect labour supply preferences. The studies of
Bourguignon and Magnac (1990), Blundell and Laisney (1988) and Dagsvik etal.
(1988) document these issues while dealing with taxes. Moreover, the latter two
studies,usingthesamesubsampleoftheINSEEsurveyBudgetsdesFamilles1979,
but rather different behavioural models, find high uncompensated wage elasti-
cities which may be considered unrealistic on a priori grounds. Using the same
survey as an illustration, this paper examines the robustness of these results to
alternative interpretations ofobserved hours information.
'The next two subsections present the relevant basic ideas and the alternative
interpretations ofhours information studied here. Section 2 briefly discusses the
model specification and the data, and section 3 presents and interprets the esti-
mationresults. Section 4gives the resultsofthe tests. We concludewith directions
for future work. Appendix A gives descriptive statistics and some preliminary
estimation results. Details on the algebra of the tests are collected in Appendix
B.
1.1 A Modelling Framework
We start from an economic model for desired hours:
h' = h'(w, x,z) + E, ( 1)
where w denotes the net marginal wage rate, x denotes netfull income and z
a vector ofhousehold characteristics. The randomness ofpreferences is assumed
to result in the additive error term E • By contrast, the data set we have contains
no information ondesired hours, but only information on reportednormal hours
ofwork and, for those reporting zero hours, a distinction is drawn between the
individuals presently seeking work (henceforth seekers) and the others.Two distinct sets of questions arise: (i) How should we treat the seekers? As
participants? (This is closest to the ILO definition of participation). As non-
participants? (This is implicitly assumed in studies wherejob search information
is either not available or ignored). Should they simply be excluded? (This may
cause selection bias). (ii) Are the reported normal hours ofwork for each indi-
vidual on her supply curve (desired hours)? Ifnot, how are they to be related to
desired hoursofwork? Bothsets ofquestions involve a discussion ofdemandside
conditions and their variation over time. Failure to address them satisfactorily
may result in the misspecification ofthe preference structure.
In the following analysis, we treat the seekers as desiring to supply a positive, but
unspecified, number of hours. The possibility for some non seeking non-
participants to be in fact discouraged workers (see Blundell, Ham and Meghir,
1990)will notbeconsidered.This is equivalent to assuming tb assuming negligible
searchcosts. We retain theframework introduced by Blundell andLaisney (1988)
ofgrouping the hours information, and place particular emphasis on the impli-
cations of different degrees ofgrouping. The models considered range from an
extendedProbit model in which the standardProbit model is extendedtoaccount
forjob-seekersamongthose not in employment. In thisspecificationparticipation
information alone is utilised. At the other extreme is the extended Tobit model
where reported hours are assumed to coincide with desired hours. The grouping
model lies in this range and assumes hours ofwork provide only limited infor-
mation on desired hours. In fact, given that hours are recorded as integers, there
remains some degree of grouping even in the Tobit model, which must be
considered as an approximation. However, a look at the distribution ofreported
hours in our sample, pictured in Figure A1, shows that the Tobit specification
does not seem a priori attractive.
1.2 Sample Likelihoods under Different Hours Information
Wepartitionthehoursrange in intervals 1k•k = O•..• K andthesetofindividuals
in index sets J k' k = O•..• K defined through:
iEJk~hiElk' (2)
\
where hi denotes the hours reported by individual i . The set S ofseekers is a
subset of J 0 and our assumptions are as follows:
(3)
where an overbar indicates the complement.
2The sequence ofmodels we consider are distinguished by the increasing amount
ofinformation on hours ofwork that is exploited in the sample likelihood. The
simplest model, termedExtendedProbit, has the following sample likelihood:
L:= n P[h;EloJn P[h;EIol\i~EJnP[h;EIol\iEEJ, (4)
iEJO-S iES iE]O
where E denotes the event offinding a job available when searching. Assuming
independence between this event and h' conditionalontheobserved regressors,
the probabilities P[i E EJ and 1- PIi E EJ will factor out. Indeed, given the
absence of parameter restrictions, maximization of (4) will be equivalent to
maximization of:
L p = n P[h;EloJn P[h;EIoJn P[h;EIoJ· (4')
iEJo-S iES iE]0
Although one could advance a number of reasons casting doubt on the inde-
pendence assumption, it was tested in the study ofBlundell et al. (1987) and was
not rejected.
Considering a grouping of hours in K groups leads to the Extended Grouped
specification which has the sample likelihood:
K
L g = n P[h;EloJn P[h;EIoJnn P[h;ElkJ· (5)
iEJo-S iES k= I iEJ k
Finally, takingreportedhoursas desired hourswhile takingaccountoftheseekers
results in the Extended Tobit model with sample likelihood:
Lt = n P[h;EloJnp[h;E/oJn.f(h;), (6)
iEJo-S iES iE]0
where .f denotes the density ofdesired hours implied by (1).
1.3 Diagnostic Tests
The first set ofdiagnostics we consider are versions ofLagrange Multiplier tests
suggested by White (1982), and are based on the theory of pseudo maximum
likelihood. In the Monte-Carlo results reported in Lechner (1991) the corres-
ponding quasi-Lagrange-multiplier (QLM) version was found to have superior
small sample properties in comparison with the standard LM test. Furthermore,
theestimatoroftheasymptoticcovariance matrix used is consistentin caseswhere
the MLestimatorofthevector ofcoefficients is consistent, yet not asymptotically
efficient. This is important in the present situation since we use non-efficient
two-step procedures in estimation. The specific formulas for the grouped, Probit
andTobit models used in this paper are obtained through slight modifications of
those given by Chesher and Irish (1987) and are provided in Appendix B.
3To test for the appropriate degree of hours grouping we employ a sequence of
Hausman-Wutests in which the potentialefficiencygains from an increase in the
amount of information on hours used in estimation is compared with the likely
inconsistency resulting from hours constraints. The idea ofthe tests conducted is
that for two nested groupings, if the assumptions (3) are valid for both, the esti-
matesobtainedwith thefinergroupingwill be moreefficient than thoseobtained
with thecoarserone,whereas they will become inconsistent for thefirst one if (3)
is valid for the second one only.
Finally, we present results of misspecification tests based on the Heckman-
Andrewsprinciple(seeAndrews, 1988a,b),which is ageneralisationoftheclassical
Pearson X 2 statistic. This test seems to be particularly attractive in our context,
since the necessary grouping ofendogenous and exogenous variables is naturally
suggested by the different models used.
2 Empirical Analy~is
2.1 The model specification
Thegeneralform ofourlaboursupply model for hours ofwork h can bewritten
1 m
h=o. +0 -+0. -
o I W 2 W (7)
where w is the netreal marginalwage and m • a measureof(real)virtual income
thatwill be discussed below, is constructed using the budget identity m = e - wh
in which e is total expenditure (measured directly in the Budgets des Familles)
and w is the marginal wage as in (7). Although we did not attempt to correctfor
the discrepancy between real expenditure and consumption due to infrequency
ofpurchase (as in Kay et aI., 1984), we do allow for measurement error and/or
endogeneity of m during estimation by the use of instrumental variables (see
Keen, 1986).
The attractionofusing (7) is twofold. First, it is a simple "three parameter" model
but unlike the linear labour supply model it allows Slutsky consistency while
permitting negative sloping labour supply behaviour (see Stern, 1986). Second,
usingourdefinition of m as in (8) it is life-cycle consistent as defined in Blundell
and Walker (1986). A simple rearrangement of (7) generates the following
Stone-Geary earnings equation.
wh = wY-I3[x~ a(w.p)].
4
(8)with x the virtualfull income given by x = e + w(T - h) = m + wT , where T is
the total time available and a (w ,p) = w(T - y) + d, where d represents the






Note that d is identified from a simple participation Probit since it is computed
as the ratiobetween thecoefficients of 1/ wand m / wandratios ofcoefficients
are not affected by the lack ofidentification ofthe scale parameter in the Probit
model.
Thebudgetlineresultingfrom theFrenchtax system is piecewise linear,with kinks
at the ends ofeach ofthe tax brackets, at the points where the withdrawal ofthe
means-tested child benefit begins and ends, and at the various ceilings for the
social insurance contributions. However, for most women in the sample, visual
inspection of the budget line reveals no striking deviation from linearity. See
Appendix D. For more details on the way the French tax-benefit system is
modelled here, see Dagsvik et al. (1988) andour 1988 study. Herethebudgetline
is linearized around the observed point, using the budget identity as explained
above. Since m can besuspected ofendogeneity onseveral grounds, it has been
instrumented.
As we shall see below, this model passes non-linearity checks, whereas, inspiteof
our apparently rudimenta7 treatment ofthe tax system, disregard oftaxes leads
to rejectionofthe linearity ofthe earningsequationimplied by equation(8) (see
Appendix C).
While we allow y and d to vary with demographics, for the purpose of this
exercise we treat f?> as constant. Thus, two direct extensions of this work would
consist in letting f?> vary (i) with demographics (ii) with 1n w (see Blundell and
Meghir, 1986). The latter has the advantage of allowing backward bending and
forward slopingfor a given m , which is notthecasefor (7) or(9). Note however
that (9) does allow both positive and negative wage elasticities, varying directly
with demographics through d. In particular, negative uncompensated wage
elasticities are more likely to arisewhen m is smalland consequentlywhen hours
are large. Simple separability tests are also available with specifi,cation (9) when
estimating demand for goods equations (see Blundell, Laisney and Ruth, 1989).
As we shall see, the results of diagnostics do not suggest a departure from the
chosen functional form. The concavity of the cost function is ensured by the
conditionthat m + w y > d , which says thatthe maximum resourcesshouldcover
the minimum expenditure and guarantees that desired hours will remain below
the maximum number ofhours available for work y .
1This statement might confuse the reader, after our remark onthe near-linearityofthe budget constraint. Linearity
hereconcerns the earnings equation implied by the preferences under the assumption ofa linearbudget restriction.
52.2 Data
Our sample consists of3658 households. We exclude housing expenditure from
total expenditure e since we may consider it to be fixed outside period specific
labour supply and consumption choices. Regional unemployment is introduced
in thewage equationinsteadofthetension indicatorpreviouslyused(seeBlundeB
and Laisney, 1988 and Dagsvik et aI., 1988 for details). Indeed, in those earlier
studies, we had chosen households facing the same tax parameters resulting in a
smaBersampleofonly 1928 households. Forestimation purposes, this may create
some identification problems, as pointed out by Moffitt (1988), since both pre-
ferences and taxes depend on some demographics: using a sample with tax
parametervariation may overcome that problem tosome extent. Otherwise using
the same selection rule, we have managed to almost double the sample size.
Table Al in Appendix A gives the means ofthe variables relevant for equations
(8) and (9) for five subsamples: the first three correspond to participants with
positive hours falling in the three hours ranges used in estimation, and the last
two correspond to seekers and non participants. The seekers represent 5.5% of
the total sample (sampling weights have not been used in this study) and 11.4%
of aB participants. The participation rate is .480 if seekers are considered as
participants and .425 if they are considered as non-participants. Note that the
characteristics of the seekers do not lie between those of participants and non-
participants: on average the seekers are younger, have more children at ecole
materneBe, areless likelytoowntheirhousingand have higherpredictedmarginal
wage rates. Theireducation level pattern is closerto thatofparticipantssupplying
long hours than to non-seekers. It would be exaggerated to infer from this that
they are not really searching for work, but it might be more appropriate to view
these women as new entrants having spent some time outside the labour market.
Theyprobablydifferfrom thestandardview ofprimeaged menwhohave recently
been layed-off.
3 Estimation Results
3.1 The Parameter Estimates
Table 1 sh~ws maximum likelihood estimation results2 for the extended Probit
model (Lp), the extended grouped model (Lg), and the extended Tobit model
(Lt).ThegroupingcorrespondstothefoBowing partitionofthehours range: long
hours3: h> 41.5; full-time: 35.5 < h < 41 .5; part-time: 1.5 < h < 35.5 ;
2Obtainedwitha Newton-Raphsonprocedurebasedon theHessianmatt'xfor theProbitmodelandwiththeBHHH
option ofthe Gauss proceduremaxlikwith analytical gradient and Hessian for the other models. In all cases the last
stepused Newton-Raphsonandthecovariance matrixestimatewas obtained ascombinationofinverseoftheHessian
and outer product ofgradient.
3 We use theterm "long hours" ratherthan "overtime" since the hours information concerns reported hours and long
hours do not imply the payment of an overtime premium.
6non participation: h < 1.5. (Hours are reported as integers on two digits, hence
no individualwill beobservedontheboundaryofan interval). The results for the
latter two models are given in terms ofscaled coefficients and precision for ease
ofcomparison with the probit estimates.
Strictly speaking, the shape ofthe budget constraint should enter the calculation
of the probability for desired hours of being in any given range. However, the
examplesofbudgetconstraintspresentedinAppendixDshowthatapproximating
thebudgetconstraintwith its linearizationat observed hourswill notlead togross
mistakes with the data set we use.
The specification presented is the result of a descending specification search
operated with the Probit model, the argument being that this yields consistent
estimates. The age regressors are self-explanatory. The children variables are
counts except for the category "other children" which is split in three dummies.
The category "small children" groups children too young for ecole maternelle,
whetherthey arekept athomeorelsewhere.Thecategory"otherchildren"groups
children at primary and secondary school._The education variables entering
preferences are general education degrees, in contrast with those entering the
wage equation (Table A2), which combine general and vocational degrees. The
reference category consists ofpeople who failed the lowest exam ordid not take
it and failed or dropped out at higher stages. This explains the signs in Table AZ.
Theresults appearfairlysimilar acrossthethree models. A numberofcoefficients
on socio-demographic variables are significant. It is difficult to discuss the eco-
nomic interpretation ofthose reduced form coefficients.
The structu;~lcoefficients are given in Table 2, where the first column contains
values for the Probit model obtained by setting a = 33 . The models now appear
to differ somewhat, especially as regards the effects of age and of the children
variables. The maximum number ofhours available for work has its maximum at
age 25.5,29.2 and 28.8, respectively, for the three models. The maximum number
ofweekly hours available for work to a 40-years old woman without children is
38.12 intheextendedgrouped model,and44.35 ifshe lives in asuburb.Itbecomes
negative for a woman older than 56. In interpreting these figures it should be
remembered that the normal error term added to equation (9) can be given the
interpretation of 1- f3 times a random term entering the parameter y. The
latterwill thus have a standarddeviation of43.9 for theextendedgrouped model.
The effects of education on preferences, as captured by the chosen regressors,
appear to be non-monotonous, with a maximum for lower secondary school. The
childrenvariablesactasexpectedanditprovedusefultobreakthelinearityimplied
by a countfor the category"otherchildren". The minimum expendituresongoods
are not well determined, except for the effect ofbeing in the process ofbuying a
house: this has a positive impact on minimum expenditures and thus on desired
hours (see equation (9».
73.2 The Estimated Labour Supply Elasticities
Table3showsmuchlowerelasticitiesthanthoseobtainedinthestudiesofBlundell
andLaisney (1988) and Dagsvik etal. (1988). Thefirst thoughtwas thatthis came
from the use ofa sample with tax parametervariation, but this does not seem to
be the only reason since the same operation (including the change to regional
unemployment rates) with the model of the second named study produced no
significant change4. We also found elasticities to be fairly sensitive to the choice
andspecification ofsocio-demographiceffects. The maximum absolutevalues of
elasticities are obtained in the part-time group, as expected because of the pre-
sence ofhours in the denominator. This is at variance with the results from some
other country studies reported by Nakamura and Nakamura (1991). Another
interesting feature of these results is that we now have some individuals with
negative uncompensated wage elasticities. Inspection shows that these are on
average either older women or women with more small children or children at
ecole maternelle. The concavity condition is never violated in the sample.
4Theproblem thereseemstolie insocio-demographicinflexibilityofthe functional form, which resultsin elasticities
that depend on no socio-demographic characteristic. See Laisney et at. (1991).
8Table 1. Results for the extended Probit, Grouped,.and Tobit models with full tax system.
Model Extended Probit Extended grouped ExtendedTobit
Variable coeff. std.err. prob. % coeff. std.err. prob. % coeff. std.err. prob. %
intercept 0.8246 0.2487 0.09 0.8694 0.2180 0.02 0.8855 0.2256 0.01
(age-40)/10 -0.3812 0.0330 0.00 -0.3130 0.0269 0.00 -0.3156 0.0260 0.00
same, squared -0.1310 0.0304 0.00 -0.1458 0.0276 0.00 -0.1403 0.0268 0.00
primary school 0.2909 0.0570 0.00 0.2834 0.0520 0.00 0.2823 0.0512 0.00
lower secondary 0.4548 0.0857 0.00 0.4051- 0.0748 0.00 0.4271 0.0759 0.00
end secondary 0.3623 0.1172 0.19 0.3097 0.1025 0.25 0.3209 0.1046 0.21
higher education 0.2863 0.1424 4.43 0.2289 0.1285 7.48 0.2300 0.1299 7.66
small children -0.6878 0.0658 0.00 -0.5710 0.0564 0.00 -0.5756 0.0555 0.00
ecole maternelle -0.4793 0.0515 0.00 -0.4540 0.0453 0.00 -0.4484 0.0443 0.00
one other child -0.2481 0.0623 0.01 -0.2454 0.0522 0.00 -0.2457 0.0509 0.00
two other children -0.6666 0.0737 0.00 -0.6483 0.0636 0.00 -0.6512 0.0625 0.00
> 2 other children -0.9137 0.0903 0.00 -0.8942 0.0851 0.00 -0.9052 0.0844 0.00
suburb dummy 0.1610 0.0481 0.08 0.1421 0.0418 0.06 0.1480 0.0414 0.03
1/marg. wage [1/w] 2.3854 2.5798 35.51 2.8082 2.2546 /21.29 2.0920 2.3373 37.08
owner/w -0.9884 0.9219 28.36 -1.0901 0.8624 20.62 -1.1725 0.8537 16.96
buyer/w 2.1465 0.6247 0.06 1.7249 0.5466 0.16 1.7306 0.5330 0.11
m/w -1.5684 0.1866 0.00 -1.3945 0.1662 0.00 -1.3317 0.1654 0.00
1/0 0.0300 0.0006 0.00 0.0312 0.0004 0.00
-2*Log Likelihood 4397 10238 17877Table 2. Structural parameters corresponding to the coefficients reported in
Table 1.
Model Extended Probit Extended grouped Extended Tobit
Parameter coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value
y_O 37.24 6.19 38.12 6.75 36.39 6.38
y_age -17.21 -18.20 -13.73 -18.75 -12.97 -19.22
y_age2 -5.92 -7.33 -6.39 -8.57 -5.77 -8.21
y_prim. school 13.14 8.61 12.43 8.63 11.60 8.43
yJower second. 20.54 8.58 17.76 8.50 17.55 8.50
y_end second. 16.36 5.22 13.58 4.98 13.19 4.84
-
y_higher educ. 12.93 3.51 10.04 3.00 9.45 2.84
y_smail child. -31.06 -16.42 -25.04 -15.68 -23.66 -15.86
y_ecole matern. -21.64 -14.56 -19.91 -'15.53 -18.43 -15.47
y_one other ch. -11.20 -7.55 -10.76 -8.40 -10.10 -8.23
y_two·other ch. -30.10 -16.63 -28.43 -18.18 -26.76 -18.28
y_> 2 other ch. -41.26 -19.05 -39.21 -20.16 -37.20 -20.19
y_suburb dummy 7.27 5.85 6.23 5.67 6.08 5.68
[3 0.27 8.87 0.24 8.50 0.22 8.20
d 0 292.48 0.96 387.27 1.28 302.10 0.92
downer -121.20 -1.07 -150.34 -1.21 -169.33 -1.31
d_buyer 263.19 3.50 237.88 3.24 249.91 3.32
10Table 3. Elasticities.
Model Extended Probit Extended grouped Extended Tobit
Subsample 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Part-time
wage -0.02 0.46 0.74 1.18 "6.25 -0.09 0.34 0.58 0.96 5.27 -0.03 0.38 0.61 0.97 5.27
income5 -8.10 -1.64 -1.11 -0.79 -0.23 -7.2fJ -1.47 -1.00 -0.71 -0.21 -6.67 -1.35 -0.92 -0.65 -0.19
Slutsky 0.25 0.73 1.01 1.45 6.52 0.14 0.58 0.82 1.21 5.51 0.20 0.60 0.83 1.20 5.54
Full-time
~age 0.002 0.23 0.34 0.46 0.89 -0.04 0.17 0.27 0.38 0.76 -.002 0.19 0.28 0.38 0.76
mcome -1.16 -0.67 -0.56 -0.44 -0.23 -1.04 -0.59 -0.50 -0.40 -0.21 -0.96 -0.55 -0.46 -0.37 -0.19
Slutsky 0.27 0.50 0.61 0.73 1.16 0.20 0.41 0.51 0.62 1.00 0.22 0.41 0.50 0.60 0.98
Long hours
~age -.003 0.18 0.30 0.42 0.76 -0.05 0.13 0.23 0.34 0.65 -.007 0.15 0.24 0.34 0.64
mcome -0.94 -0.59 -0.49 -0.39 -0.18 -0.85 -0.53 -0.44 -0.35 -0.16 -0.78 -0.49 -0.40 -0.32 -0.15
Slutsky 0.27 0.45 0.57 0.69 1.03 0.19 0.37 0.47 0.58 0.89 0.21 0.37 0.46 0.56 0.86
all participants
0.002 wage 0.25 0.37 0.55 2.77 -0.05 0.18 0.30 0.45 2.24 -.003 0.20 0.31 0.45 2.28
income -3.96 -0.78 -0.59 -0.47 -0.22 -3.54 -0.69 -0.53 -0.42 -0.20 -3.2fJ -0.64 -0.49 -0.38 -0.18
Slutsky 0.27 0.52 0.64 0.82 3.03 0.20 0.42 0.54 0.69 2.48 0.22 0.42 0.53 0.67 2.50
seekers
particip/wage 0.09 0.46 0.82 1.27 3.74 0.04 0.33 0.62 0.98 2.98 0.07 0.37 0.66 1.01 2.95
non-participants
particip/wage 0.11 0.78 1.20 1.81 4.76 0.09 0.63 0.90 1.40 3.64 0.08 0.63 0.95 1.44 3.67
5 This is the virtual income m.
11Table 4. Diagnostics: empirical significance levels (%).
Model Extd. Probit Extd. Grouped Extd. Tobit
QLM-Test d.oJ.
linearity 3 35.965 12.164 14.825
m2 1 36.322 10.743 17.293
w2 1 15.829 9.342 7.830
lnw 1 20.083 11.571 9.386
homoscedasticity 16 0.012 0.000 0.000
(age-40)/10 1 1.275 0.000 0.000
same, squared 1 8.241 78.918 85.372
lower secondary school 1 24.19l 0.264 0.007
end secondary school 1 0.011 0.046 0.002
ecole maternelle 1 6.841 31.005 4.820
one otherchild 1 49.576 2.316 1.969
two otherchildren 1 10.241 0.168 1.693
>2 other children 1 80.761 0.000 0.010
suburb dummy 1 24.479 2.648 1.848
l/marginal wage [l/w] 1 0.464 0.164 0.000
owner/w 1 71.933 0.006 0.084
buyer/w 1 2.985 0.067 0.096
m/w 1 23.190 0.000 0.000
normality 2 20.645 0.000 0.000
skewness 1 8.283 0.000 0.000
kurtosis 1 80.828 0.000 0.000
Heckman-Andrews tests
participation 1 18.633 0.000 ' 0.000
predicted hours 4 8.093 0.000 0.000
marginal wage 5 38.015 0.000 0.000
m 5 12.024 0.000 0.000
end secondary school 2 38.880 0.000 0.000
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4 Model Evaluation and Predictive Performance
Table 4 shows the results of diagnostic tests6. The first series of tests concerns
non-linearitytests:we testseparatelyandjointlyagainst T11 2 , W 2 and In w missing
in the earnings equation (8). The second series concerns heteroscedasticity: we
test against a special form of heteroscedasticity, namely with the logarithm of
variance linear in all non-constant model regressors. (We have deleted entries
consistently above the 5% empirical significance level, including the models
reported in Appendix C). The third series concerns non-normality: we test
separately against skewness and kurtosis and jointly against both.
Linearity is passed easily (except for the modelswith incomplete treatmentofthe
tax system, see Appendix C: this is no surprise since one can expect a tradeoff
between non-linearity in the budget restriction and non-linearity in the prefe-
rences).
Fortheprobitmodel, heteroscedasticityappearsonlythroughthedummyvariable
"education= end ofsecondary school". The similarity with Laisney et aI. (1991)
on this point is striking. Since this questions consistency, we have estimated a
model explicitly allowing for this type of heteroscedasticity. Although heteroge-
neity appears between the subsample defined by this dummy (which represents
6.8% of the total) and the rest of the sample, the coefficients for the latter are
only slightly altered, suggesting that inconsistency is not a problem for most of
the;sample.
The normality check is passed easily by the probit model, (and this is confirmed
by testing against an SNP alternative, see Gabler et aI., 1990) but non-normality,
as reflected in QLM statistics, becomes a problem when more information on
hoursis used.Thisisafamiliarphenomenon,which isdocumentedin Monte-Carlo
experiments by Blundell, Peters and Smith (1989). There is yet another inter-
pretation: since all these tests are consistent, they will reject the null of a valid
groupingofhourswhich is maintainedwhen testingfor non-normality, in case the
invalidity of the grouping leads to inconsistency ofthe estimator. This interpre-
tation is also suggested by the Hausman tests reported below. Heteroscedasticity
becomes also more stringent and the same comment applies.
The Heckman-Andrews tests reported are based on clustering the endogenous
variable according to participation (2 classes), and the exogenous variables
accordingto (a) nothing (1 class), (b) predicted hours (4 classes corresponding to
thegroups used in the estimation ofthe extended grouped model), (c) predicted
marginal wage rate (5 classes), (d) predicted virtual income (5 classes) and (e)
"end of secondary school" (2 classes), and forming the corresponding cartesian
6 Since all test statistics are asymptotically X
2 we only indicate the corresponding degrees of freedom and the
empirical significance level.
13products7. No rejection occurs for the Probit models, whereas the specification is
constantly rejected when using hours information. The same interpretati~nas
above can be drawn here. However, we should'also note that the small sample
properties ofthese Heckman-Andrews tests have yet to beinvestigated..
Table 5. Hausman tests.
Null Extended Tobit 'Extended Grouped
Alternative statistic' d.oJ. sign. % statistic d.oJ. sign. %
26.63 13 1.48 34.47 13 0.10
PI-obit 28.37 14 1.26 36.28 14 0.09
69.07 15 0.00 - 134.55 15 0.00
17.41 9 4.27
Extended
Grouped 42.30 10 0.00
42.76 11 0.00
Table 5 presents the results of Hausman tests for the overall validity of each
alternativetreatmentofthehoursinformation.Theresultsarepresentedin matrix
form where the intersection of line i and column j corresponds to the test of
the validity ofmodel j when model i is assumed correct. Each row is repeated
three times, to take' account of problems with the failure of positive semi-
definitenessofthedifferencebetweenthecovariancematrices,whicharerevealed
by comparison ofthe standard errors reported in Table 1. We drop the negative
eigenvalues, which amounts to restricting attention to a subspace where positive
semi-definiteness holds. In a further step we also investigate the effect ofdistru-
sting small positive eigenvalues, which is valid as well for the same reason. In this
way we find that-the extended Tobit specification is mildly rejected when tested
against the extended grouped, but that both are severely rejected whentested
against the;probit. That is no real surprise given the previous discussion. Rather
moresurprisingis thefact thattheextendedgroupedspecificationis moreseverely
rejected than the extended Tobit.
7 We report only results based on the ~J estimate of the ,covariance matrix, due to numerical problems with the
use of ~z' (See Andrews, 1988a,b for details).
14Finally, in Table 6 we present an assessment of within sample predictive
performance. Table 6(a) gives the sum of estimated probabilities for each cell
using the estimates from each model specification. In the case of the.Probit the
variance is set as in Table 2. It is noticeable that the impact ofusing more hours
information is to increase over-prediction ofparticipation. Table 6(b) focuses on
the participants and in particular on the ability of the models to replicate the
observed hours distribution. The results are disappointing and confirm the
impression from 6(a), that even conditional on participation the model predicts
too many part-time workers. To some extent this may reflect the importance of
fixed costs which suggest a bimodal distribution between non-participation and
full-time. This would also go some way towards explaining the low forecast
non-participation rate in 6(a).
Table 6: Within Sample Simulation Performance
Model non-part. part-time full-time long hours
(a).Unconditional Expectations -
Probit 1860 1030 124 444
Grouped 1692 1102 140 525 .
Tobit 1602 1134 140 489
Actual 1902 342 986 228
(b) Conditional Expectations (on participation)
Probit 998 121 438
Grouped 952 124 479
Tobit \ 983 125 448
Actual 342 986 228
Gi\'l.,tl the limited hours variation in our sample it proved impossible to obtain
sensible fixed costs estimates, that is a generalised selectivity model ofthe Cogan
(1981) type could not be identified. This confirms the overall suspicion that the
results on labour supply are driven by the partidpation decision itself. However,
it may also reflect a more important consideration relating to the pay-off to
retaining full-time employment even where part-time employment would yield
short-run benefits.
155 Conclusions
This paper has concerned the detailed examination ofinformation over hours of
workandjobsearch in theestimationoflaboursupplymodelsfor marriedwomen
in the Frenchdataset Budgets des FamilIes. Although normal hours ofwork for
thosewomeninemploymentareavailable,thisinformationmaynotreflectdesired
hours ofwork. Moreover, for those not in employment but searching for work it
would seemunreliableto assume theirdesired hours ofwork are non-positive. As
a result we treat job seekers as participants and consider various degrees of
grouping on hours ofwork.
A discrete choice model which treats job seekers as participants and which ack-
nowledges the full implications ofthe French tax and benefit system appears to
produce most plausible results. Utilising information on hours in grouped form
or in actual hours form appeared to add little to this specification and no model
could explain satisfactorily the observed distribution ofhours between part-time
and full-time. However, relaxing information over the tax and benefit system
appeared to result in inferior model ·estimates. Qur preferred model displayed
significantly smaller wage elasticity estimates than those obtained in previous
studies. Even there we found some indication ofdistributional misspecification,
mostespeciallywith heteroscedasticity, butobtainedsomeevidencethatthis may
not affect consistency for the largest part ofthe sample.
Clearly these results are heavily influenced by the lack ofsignificant variation in
observed hours. Nevertheless there does appear to be an important distinction
betweenthe participationand·hours decision (seealso theresults ofBourguignon
and Magnac, 1990). However, with the recent availability'ofthe 1985 data source,
which is known to indicate an increase in the proportion of women working
part-time, it may become possible to identify a more precise andseparateprocess
for hours of work conditional on pa,rticipation. Our conjecture is that correct
treatment of reported hours and job-seekers sh.ould result in more stability of
preference parameters over time and our intention is to test this hypothesis.
16Appendix A: Data and wage equation .
Figure At. Distribution of"normal" hours ofwork per week for working mar-
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50TableAt. Descriptive statistics.
INSEE sUlVey Budgets des FamilIes 1978-1979,3658 households based on a married couple.8
Subsample Participants Part-time Full-time " Long hours Seekers Non seekers
# Observ. 1556 342 986 228 200 1902
Variable min mean max min mean max min mean max min mean max min mean max min mean max
age 26 37.997 60 26 38.854 5~ 26 37.588 60 26 38.825 60 26 36.910 59 26 41.146 65
suburbs 0 0.420 1 0 0.380 1 0 0.442 1 0 0.386 1 0 0.390 1 0 0.361 1
prim.school 0 0.438 1 0 0.415 1 0 0.432 1 0 0.4% 1 0 0.515 1 0 0.410 1
lower second 0 0.228 1 0 0.193 1 O. 0.255 1 0 0.1~7 1 0 0.165 1 0 0.151 1
end second. 0 0.077 1 0 0.058 1 0 0.089 1 0 0.053 1 0 0.065 1 0 0.068 1
higher educ. 0 0.031 1 0 0.035 l' 0 0.031 1 0 0.026 1 0 0.070 1 0 0.042 1
small child 0 0.148 3 0 0.0% .2 0 0.166 3 0 0.145 2 0 0.175 2 0 0.202 3
ec. matern. 0 0.184 2 0 0.234 2 0 0.177 2 0 0.136 2 0 0.310 2 0 0.239 3
other child 0 0.931 5 0 1.301 5 0 0.816 5 0 0.868 4 0 1.080 5 0 1.423 10
all children 0 1.262 5 0 1.632 5 0 1.160 5 0 1.149 5 0 1.565 5 0 1.864 12
owner 0 0.106 1 0 0.114 1 0 0.102 1 0 0.110 1 0 0.095 1 0 0.174 1
buyer 0 0.454 1 0 0.436 1 0 0.474 1 0 0.395 1 0 0.430 1 0 0.400 1
marg.wage·9 8.065 13.028 22.728 9.119 12.880 22.072 8.065 13.208 22.728 8.656 12.470 21.906 8.874 13.300 20.634 7.434 12.831 23.30'5
m.
9011 57711 163524 9011 59878 163524 11202 57545 123614 14975 55180 131862 23983 59890 139255 -740 68268 251955
expend.·10 22046 82565 187884 22026 74184 187884 22026 84923 158543 22026 84936 172819
hours 3 36.630 66 3 21.1% 35 36 39.862 41 42 45.807 66
8 For further indications on the selection rule, see Blundell and Laisney (1988).
9 •=predicted. Nominal values in 1979 Francs, hourly wage rate.
10 Computed as e ~ m + wh using observed hours and predicted values for m and w.
18Table A2. Wage equation.
,Dependentvariable: log (gross wage), 1556 observations, R2 = .244





































































1 These are computed under homoscedasticity.
2 The reference category corresponds to no professional (or vocational) degree and no general education degree.
19Appendix B: Formulas used in the computation oftest statistics
Denote the score vector under H 0 :e = (e 1 • •e~·)' by s • the OPG'matrix by I
and the information matrix by J . Partitioning sand J accordingly, the QLM
test statistic is given by
QLM = S 2 ' ( J 22 - J 21 J ~: J 12)- \ ([J - 1 / J - \] 22 ) - \ (J22 - J 2\ J ~ : J \2) - \ s 2 •
See White (1982, 19832 orGourieroux and Monfort (1989) for details. Estimates
of / and J under H are given by the empirical covariance ofthe score and by
the evaluation of the information matrix at the estimated (restricted) vector of
parameters (e ~' ,e~,)' .
It is convenient to express all these elements using generalised residuals (see
Chester and Irish, 1987). Denoting by' x the regressors, by t the variables used
forthevariance(homoscedasticitytest)andby z thepotentiallyomittedvariables,
the elements ofthe score needed are: -
where h denotes 1/(1 and e(n) the (centered) nth generalized residual. The
first two elements appear in s 1 in the notation above, whereas s 2 consists ofa
selection from the other elements, depending on the precise nature of the test.
Thethird element will be used in heteroscedasticity tests, the fourth and fifth for
skewness and kurtosIs, andthesixth for missingvariables.Theinformation matrix
can be written in terms of the second moments of the generalized residuals:
denoting E ij = E(e(i)e(j») and including all potential elements ofthe score, we
have:
20J 22 =
Forthe probit model, the second elementofthe score, that corresponding to h,
mustbediscarded, and consequentlythe last line and last columnof J II , as well
as the last line of J 12 •
For the computation ofthe generalized residuals and their second moments we
must distinguish between the three models. See Chesher and Irish (1987, 41) for
details.
(1) Probit: let w = xc, p = <pew) and .f = <pew). Then:
e(I)= f (y_p).












(2) Extended Tobit: let y denote hours worked, d I' d 2' d 3 denote three
dummies corresponding to non-participants, seekers and participants, respecti-
vely,let t=hy-w and e=-d l f/(1-p)+cI 2 f/p. Then:
21e(4) = -w(3 + w 2)e + d 3(t4 - 3)
and the E matrix is given on the next page, after the E matrix for the extended
grouped model.
(3) Extended grouped: let d I' d 2' d 3' d 4' d 5 denote dummies for non
participants, part-time, long hours and seekers, respectively, and v denote the
vector (- 00, 1.5,35.5,41.5, + 00). Furtherdenote by Z thevectorwith components






d s 1 - <I>(Z2)
Z~<I>(Z2)
d s 1 - <I>(Z2)
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I IAppendix C: Perception ofthe tax system
Table C1 shows estimation results for probit models with different assumptions
on how the tax system affects the decisions ofthe households through its impact
onthemarginaltaxrateandonthevirtual unearnedincome:thefirstoneconsiders
the complete tax system, including benefits and social security contributions, the
second considers only taxes in a restricted sense, ignoring benefits and contribu-
tions, and the third one sets the marginal tax rate to zero and corresponds to a
linear budget constraint. Given the comments in subsection 2.1, the differences
between the th.ree specifications will lie more in overall differences in marginal
wage rates than in the way the latter change over the range offeasible working
hours. See also Appendix D.
The model that differs most from the others is the Probit model where taxes are
ignored. This leads to much stronger wage and income effects than the other
models (see Blomquist, 1988, for a theoretical investigation of the problems
resulting from disregarding the tax system in fabour supply studies). The values
reported in Table C2 for corresponding structural coefficients, that is, the coef-
ficients ofequation (9), were obtained by settingthe scale parameter (J at a value
of33. The value of.70 obtained for the marginal value oftime [3 when ignoring
taxes is clearly theoretically unacceptable. Of course one could argue that the
arbitraryvalue of (J chosen is not suited to that model. Choosing (J = 1a , which
yields a value of .21 for B, leads to a value of38.4 for the maximum number of
weekly hours available for work to a childless 40 year old woman with no general
education degree, which is near to the otherresults. But note the reversal on the
impact of education on labour supply, and the very different estimates for the
minimum expenditures, which are scale-invariant. By contrast. considering taxes
in the restricted sense only does not lead to dramatic changes in the structural
coefficients.
Table C3 tells a different story and shows clearly the trade-off between the spe-
cification ofthe marginal tax rate and non-linearity in the preferences: linearity
is passed easilyfor the modelwith complete treatmentofthe tax system only. The
deterioration ofthe heteroscedasticity diagnostic for the inverse ofthe marginal
wage reinforces this finding, which is no surprise since that diagnostic picks a
special type of non-linearity. Note that a naive application of the Akaike infor-
mation criterion would have led to prefer the model without tax~s to the others
and the model with taxes in restricted sense to the model with the full tax system.
'We hope that we have persuasively documented the danger ofthat procedure.
24Table C1. Results ofbinary Probit estimationwith different treatments ofthe perception ofthe tax system.
Model P~obit:Full tax system Probit: Taxes in restricted sense Probit: No tax
Variable coeff. std.err. prob. % coeff. std.err. prob. % coeff. std.err. prob. %
intercew 0.8246 0.2487 0.09 0.5821 0.2565 2.32 2.7082 0.2505 0.00
(age-40 /10 -0.3812 0.0330 0.00 -0.3654 0.0331 0.00 -0.3601 0.0341 0.00
same, squared -0.1310 0.0304 0.00 -0.1318 0.0305 0.00 -0.1237 0.0308 0.00
krimary school 0.2909 0.0570 0.00 0.3057 0.0573 0.00 0.1941 0.0590 0.10
ower secondary 0.4548 0.0857 0.00 0.5130 0.0869 0.00 -0.0412 0.0922 65.48
end secondary 0.3623 0.1172 0.19 0.4488 0.1192 0.01 -0.3322 0.1253 0.79
higher education 0.2863 0.1424 4.43 0.3901 0..1441 0.67 -0.3482 0.1470 1.78
small children -0.6878, 0.0658 0.00 -0.6624 0.0655 0.00 -0.5634 0.0685 0.00
ecole maternelle -0.4793:; 0;0515 O~{j)QJ -O't459t7 0.0516 0.00 -0.3599 0.0540 0.00
one other child -0.2481J 0:0623,; 0:01' -O.220iC 0.0623 0.03 -0.1018 0.0634 10.80
two other children -0.6660' 0.0731' 0.00 -O'.6J!73 0.0739 0.00 -0.3657 0.0769 0.00
> 2 other children -0.9r37 0.0903 0.00 -0.8374 0.0911 0.00 -0.3510 0.0995 0.04
suburb dummy 0.1610 0.0481 0.08 0.1795 0.0483' 0.02 0.0008 0.0493 98.62
1/marg. wage [1/w] 2.3854 2.5798 35.51 6.0182 2.9988 4.47 -16.7075 3.1280 0.00
owner/w -0.9884 0.9219 28.36 -0.8725 1.0504 40.61 0.2224 1.2185 85.51
buyer/w 2.1465 0.6247 0.06 2.6599 0.7104 0.01 2.8566 0.8271 0.05
mjw -1.5684 0.1866 0.00 -1.9893 0.2149 0.00 -4.0566 0.2886 0.00
-2*Log Likelihood 4397 4352 4182
25Table C2. Structural parameters corresponding to the coefficients reported in
Table C1.
Model Probit: Full tax Probit: Restricted Probit: No tax
system taxes
Parameter coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value
y_O 37.24 6.19 29.17 5.16 294.11 6.39
y age -17.21 -18.20 -18.31 -17.24 -39.11 -6.56
y=age2 -5.92 -7.33 -6.61 -8.43 -13.44 -6.38
yyrim. school 13.14 8.61 15.32 9.90 21.08 6.34
y lower second. 20.54 8.58 25.71 10.25 -4.48 -3.76
y=end second. 16.36 5.22 22.49 7.24 -36.09 -6.24
y_higher educ. 12.93 3.51 19.55 5.49 -37.81 -6.30
v_small child. -31.06 -16.42 -33.19 -15.84 -61.19 -6.56
y_ecole matern. -21.64 -14.56 -23.04 -14.57 -39.09 -6.57
v_one other ch. -11.20 -7.55 -11.06 -8.11 -11.06 -6.67
y_two other ch. -30.10 -16.63 -30.93 -16.53 -39.71 -6.80
y > 2 other ch. -41.26 -19.05 -41.96 -18.58 -38.13 -7.09
y=suburb dummy 7.27 5.85 9.00 7.48 0.09 0.18
f3 0.27 8.87 0.34 9.83 0.70 14.89
d 0 292.48 0.96 581.76 2.11 -792.03 -4.99
d-owner -121.20 -1.07 -84.35 -0.83 10.55 0.19
dyuyer 263.19 3.50 257.13 3.81 135.42 3.53
26Table C3. Diagnostics: empirical significance levels (%).
Model: Probit Full tax system Restricted No tax
taxes
QLM - Test d.oJ.
linearity 3 35.965 0.000 0.000
m2 1 36.322 15.924 0.000
w2 1 15.829 0.019 0.000
lnw 1 20.083 0.000 0.000
homoscedasticity 16 0.012 0.009 0.012
(age-40)/10 1 1.275 0.759 39.852
same, squared 1 8.241 " 5.832 2.940
lower secondary 1 24.193 24.564 3.861
end secondary 1 0.011 0.010 0.003
ecole maternelle 1 6.841 7.245 73.683
one other child 1 49.576 49.846 54.388
two other children 1 10.241 10.798 3.532
>2 other children 1 80.761 93.096 40.096
suburb dummy 1 24.479 30.511 3.859
l/marginal wage [l/w] 1 0.464 0.486 0.051
owner/w 1 71.933 86.762 88.148
bu"er/w 1 2.985 4.574 30.921
mw 1 23.190 12.523 7.768
normality 2 20.645 16.738 6.997
skewness 1 8.283 6.014 10.900
kurtosis 1 80.828 64.701 3.936
Heckman-Andrews tests
participation 1 18.633 15.348 19.328
predicted hours 4 8.093 5.255 10.358
marginal wage 5 38.015 22.019 46.938
m 5 12.024 11.432 16.533
end second.[x367] 2 38.880 29.113 40.032
27Appendix D: Shape ofbudget restrictions
Figures01and02showtheshapeofbudgetrestrictionsfor taxes in therestricted
sense mentioned in Appendix C. The only further non-linearity entailed in the
"full tax system" is caused by the ceiling on social security contributions. Figure
01showshypotheticalbudgetlinesfor a householdwith twochildrenandacapital
incomeof10francs perweekwherethe maleworks 40 hours perweekatanhourly
wage of30francs. Foranhourlygrosswageof12francs, thewomanremainswithin
thesametaxbracketregardlessofthenumberofweeklyhourssupplied.Shemoves
through three brackets if she earns 60 francs per hours, and thus belongs to the
upper decile of the gross wage distribution. But only for the extreme case ofan
hourly wage of 120 francs is there a visible departure from linearity. Figure 02
illustrates the impact of the number of children on disposable income through
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Figure D1. After Tax Budget Constraints for a Woman with two Children and Various
Gross Wage Rates.
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Figure D2. After Tax Budget Constraints for a Woman with a Gross Hourly Wage Rate
of60 Francs and Various numbers ofChildren.
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